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UNMANAGEABLE - TOWARD SUB SAHARAN 
AFRICAN DEBT BARGAINING?
Reginald Herbold Green
Per capita output in low-income Africa has declined so 
drastically over the last 15 years that most of the gains of 
the modern era have been wiped out. Today, low-income Africa 
is poorer than it was in 1910.
- A. W. Clausen, World Bank, 1986
Internal...growth should be seen as the foundation which makes 
sustained debt service economically possible and politically 
acceptable. No country will immiserize itself year after year 
to meet external debt obligations; on the other hand meeting 
debt payments out of growing gross domestic product and export 
flows is socially and politically acceptable.
- Philip Ndegwa, Central Bank of Kenya, 1986
To describe African debt as unmanageable is to assert that 
there is no known strategy whereby Africa can hope to combine a 
reversal of its tragic economic decline with service of its 
existing debt (except by new grants that have the same economic 
effect as debt relief). It is to diagnose the situation of 
most African countries as one of insolvency rather than simply 
illiquidity.
- John Williamson, Institute for International
Economics, 1986
Africa's debt burden is now intolerable. We cannot pay. You 
know it and all our other creditors know it. It is not a 
rhetorical question when I ask, should we really let our people 
starve so that we can pay our debts?
- Julius K. Nyerere, OAU Chairman, 1985
The Invisibility Of An Iceberg: SSA External Debt 1960-84
The term "debt crisis" has, at least in the North and among bankers or 
academic specialists, tended to mean crises threatening the solvency of major 
commercial banks and the stability of the international monetary system. In
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those terras it is reasonable to argue that Sub-Saharan African states (even 
collectively) do not pose a "debt crisis" because their gross commercial bank 
borrowing is of the order of $25 billion, even excluding write-offs or 
reserves already provided and potentially off-settable deposits.
On the other hand, in SSA, the term "debt crisis" is taken to mean levels of 
external debt to all creditors whose servicing imposes unmanageable burdens 
relative to export earnings if paid, and almost equally unattractive loss not 
only of commercial credit but also of concessional finance if allowed to go 
into or remain in default. By that definition - which is the one used in this 
paper - about three fourths of SSA’s 46 states have either a fully fledged 
external debt crisis or are on the brink of one.
The only SSA economies one could seriously propose as both truly plausible
credit risks from a commercial bank lender's point of view and prudent 
potential borrowers for general purposes from their own are Botswana and 
Cameroon. A few more may be plausible cases for consolidation and rollover 
loans or for commercial borrowing (preferably on a non-recourse project tied 
basis) for fairly safe, high yield export oriented projects. Zimbabwe and 
Kenya may be examples on a general basis and non-recourse project tied loans 
(albeit realistically more likely to be export credit agency than commercial
bank financed) may be sound for lenders and borrowers for very strong projects
even in very weak economies, e.g. the Songo Songo/Kilwa natural gas to 
ammonia/urea project in Tanzania and gold mining rehabilitation and expansion 
in Ghana.
This perception of an SSA debt crisis is a recent one - at least outside the 
chronic de facto default cases such as Zaire and the Sudan. Even at 
continental level within SSA it dates only from 1982/83. At international 
agency and academic level general recognition began to develop only from 
1984/85.
The basic available data on SSA external debt and debt service are set out in 
the tables annexed to this paper. As noted below they are even now not very 
accurate (in some cases not at all accurate), but they do demonstrate that 
continentally, and for most countries, SSA has a nearly unmanageable debt 
burden.
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* The Parameters of the Invisible
SSA external debt was small and its service - with a few exceptions - 
sustainable and sustained until 1974. Most of the countries had become 
independent in 1960 or later and, in retrospect, in the 1960s SSA faced much 
less unfavourable international economic contexts than over 1971-75 or from 
1979 to date. External debt was rising rapidly but from a low base and,
except for a handful of countries with strong export bases, most of it was
from governments (including their export credit agencies) or multilateral 
development finance institutions.
Even as of 1986 total SSA external debt (including all arrears and short term
financial institutional credit, as well as all medium and long term
obligations) was in the range of $100 to $140 billion or under 15% of total
South external debt. Commercial bank debt stood at about 25% of the total
($25 to $35 million) or perhaps 5% of total commercial banks South exposure. 
At country level it was still smaller - looked at from a global perspective - 
with no debtor over $25 billion, only 3 over $10 billion and only 5 over $5 
billion.
The 1986 levels of debt however were - as shown in the tables - high relative 
to GDP as was the debt service level of almost $10 billion relative to exports 
of goods and services of the order of $20 billion.
The 1973-1986 debt buildup has had four phases:
1. 1974—75 borrowing to ride out 1973/75 drought and terms of trade
(including, but not limited to, oil) shocks;
2. 1976-79 borrowing to speed up growth (which did indeed rise to a
sustained four year rate of over 5% a year - SSA's best period) made 
possible by sharply 'improved export earnings and commercial banks' 
willingness to lend less selectively especially to countries with low 
initial debt service ratios;
3- 1980-82 borrowing to ride out what was at first believed to be a short
term shock like 1974-75;
4
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Post 1982 borrowing - substantially from arrears and/or rescheduling - to 
avert import strangulation or open default.
The SSA debt profile has — relative to other regions - higher proportions of 
multilateral agency loans, IMF drawings, short term credits and arrears. This 
worsens the debt management problem. The first two categoriesare formally 
non-reschedulable and the last two are peculiarly hard to reschedule in 
practice. The latter three are also omitted from, or only partially recorded 
in, many international debt tabulations.
Other parameters of invisibility include very incomplete national recording 
with pre-crises estimates in several cases at or under 50/6 of post crisis 
tabulations (admittedly in large part because of very rapid arrears buildups 
especially on trade credits) as well as a case by case approach concentrating 
on one country at a time. In addition to obscuring the continental nature of 
the problem, this approach tended to cause attention to be focused almost 
totally on what the debtor had done wrong. Arguably this was a plausible 
focus to the early 1970s when only a handful of countries - e.g. Ghana, Sudan, 
Zaire - had congenitally dismal economic performance records, but it has 
become palpably unrealistic since 1979.
The View From SSA
As noted above, SSA debt service to export ratios are approaching 50?. By IMF 
calculations they were about 40? in 1985 (including IMF and short term debt 
service). By 1987 low income SSA economies are likely to be paying 20? of 
export earnings in interest on external debt alone. In extreme cases 
scheduled interest and repayments - even with most debt concessional - 
actually exceed export levels and in many - e.g. Ghana - they amount to over 
60? of gross grant and loan inflows even in the context of substantial World 
Bank/IMF backed structural adjustment programmes.
Despite the relatively low pre-1974 debt levels, the external debt service 
problems of some SSA economies are not new. Prior to 1975 over half of all 
rescheduling agreements involved SSA economies and over 1975-85 about 40?. In 
1986 over 20 SSA states sought Paris Club reschedulings, some for the eighth 
or ninth time.
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The perception and actual levels of debt service burdens in SSA are not 
uniform. At one extreme, Botswana has less external debt than external 
reserves and only moderately more interest due on debt than receivable on 
reserves. At the other extreme are twelve low income economies which the 
World Bank indicated in 1986 could never in fact repay their external debt. 
The 12 are Benin, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Mauretania, Niger, 
Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. However, if one takes all poor 
countries with 1 9 8 6 - 8 7 debt service ratios over 30% on the World Bank's basis 
(which is probably one third below the total actually payable), Guinea-Bissau, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Zaire and Mozambique enter this category. Cote 
d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Gabon have similar debt service ratios but are less poor 
and arguably could eventually repay subject to extended reschedulings.
Some Tactical Implications
For most SSA economies grants and new loans exceed interest and amortisation 
actually paid (which is substantially less than payable). The net flow has - 
according to Overseas Development Council estimates - fallen from $10 billion 
in 1980 to $4.9 billion in 1985. The 1987 estimated recovery to $7.3 billion 
(partly due to reschedulings) seems unlikely to be sustained unless very 
substantial extended reschedulings become the norm. World Bank data for IDA 
eligible countries (excluding Mozambique) show a net inflow before 
rescheduling of $5.1 billion annual average over 1980-82, $3.0 billion over 
1983-84 and $2.7 billion projected over 1986-90. Including rescheduling, the 
annual net flows become $6.2 billion, $4.8 billion and $5.0 billion 
respectively. However, both non-concessional and IMF flows had already gone 
negative by 1985 -
The SSA and individual net resource inflow countries cannot afford to 
institute unilateral rescheduling/servicing action beyond the point at which 
this would seriously jeopardise new flows. As a result, they have tended to 
build up commercial (trade) and subsequently government debt service arrears 
quietly on a semi-ignored, semi-condoned basis rather than take Peru-like 
initiatives. Nigeria - a net outflow country - did take a tentative Peruvian 
stance, but with a 40Í of exports proposed ceiling, it was when promulgated 
adequate to pay all interest and about half of principal amortisation. In the
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event it came unstuck because of the 1986 oil price collapse. The 1985
Sudanese statement of a per cent of export earnings ceiling was really a 
rephrased "won't pay because can't pay" cry of pain and the Zairean 
declaration is widely seen as a bluff or negotiating gambit not a statement of 
real intent.
For the least developed and some other low income SSA economies, full
write-off of some bilateral concessional debt has proven attainable. Except 
for the USSR, USA and Japan, major creditor governments have retrospectively 
converted loans to these states into grants. However, since some - e.g. the 
UK - charged the stream of waived repayments against their aid budget, the 
degree of additionality is somewhat problematic.
But non-reschedulable borrowing from multilateral agencies (basically the 
World Bank/ODA, IMF and African Development Bank) represent a high proportion 
of SSA borrowing and debt service. For the IDA eligible group they
represented 17.5% before (25% after) rescheduling over 1980-82 and 22% before 
(29% after) rescheduling over 1980-84 with 1986-90 projections of 29% (44%) 
respectively.
While in principle humanitarian considerations (in respect to bilateral and 
IDA concessional finance) and support for Bank/Fund approved
stabilisation/structural adjustment programmes can be used to press for 
substantial reschedulings, in practice coordination is hard. Indeed the World 
Bank has been sharply critical of bilateral representatives at Consultative 
Group meetings adopting rescheduling targets which the same governments then 
declined to meet at subsequent Paris Club sessions.
1986-1995? Projections and Premonitions
There is little reason to project any substantial improvement in the external 
economic context confronting SSA and most of its national economies over the 
period to 1995. External balance improvements since 1981 relate 
overwhelmingly to import cuts, which are by now eroding not only national 
product but also attainable export levels.
Real interest rates for SSA are even higher than global totals suggest.
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External interest and principal are paid in (or literally from the proceeds 
of) exports. Therefore the nominal interest rate needs to be adjusted by the 
nominal export price change to determine real interest, e.g. if interest is 
10% nominal and export prices fall 10Í then the effective real interest rate 
from the debtors’ perspective is 20Í even if creditor country inflation of 4? 
makes the real interest rate from their perspective 6Í. Export price changes 
have a similar effect on amortisation. With few exceptions SSA exports have 
poor nominal, let alone real, price prospects. They may stabilise or 
fluctuate around 1987 levels, but even in nominal terms these are frequently 
40-50Í below mid-1970s highs.
The 1986 oil price fall may be a marginal to substantial windfall for a 
majority of SSA economies. But for SSA as a region - and for Angola, 
Cameroon, Congo, Gabon and Nigeria individually (i.e. a third of SSA's 
population) - the net result is a substantial loss of export value and earned 
import capacity.
To date special facilities and structural adjustment programmes have been
seriously under-financed. With the number of SAPs rising and the use of IMF 
credit to plug shortfalls in other finance less and less adequate, this 
problem seems more likely to become worse rather than better over 1987-95.
Overall World Bank projections for SSA show negligible or negative real per 
capita GDP growth to 1995 - from a 1985 per capita base averaging about 25Í 
per capita less than the late 1970s. The debt service/export and debt/GDP 
ratios also either improve very slowly or worsen in these projections. For 
the low income countries even after more generous rescheduling than has
typified 1980-86, the World Bank projects 1986-90 import capacity per capita
as below either that of 1980-82 or of the mid-1970s. The same applies to
Nigeria and Angola and probably to Gabon and the Cameroon.
Preludes To Negotiations - National
It is hard to describe SSA debt negotiations to date as satisfactory to 
anybody with the possible exception of commercial banks in some of the London 
Club reschedulings. That several countries are now seeking their eighth or 
ninth rescheduling is perhaps in itself adequate evidence - the breathing
- 8 -
space is not large or long enough for revival of the economies; the creditors 
remain largely unpaid. The IMF record is rather parallel. With the potential 
exception of Zimbabwe, no major post 1978 higher credit tranche drawer has 
been able to restore adequate growth levels while repaying IMF drawings on 
time other than by re-drawing.
SSA Paris and London Club renegotiations have not been innovative even by the 
standards of these bodies. Until 1986 the central tendency for Paris Club 
reschedulings was to roll forward official debt arrears plus 18 to 24 months 
payments of principal (and sometimes interest) with 5 years grace and 5 
further years to repay principal (less for interest and arrears). While good 
faith clauses on subsequent reschedulings of further years of payments on the 
rescheduled loans are common, their actual utilisation has been much less so.
Several multi-stage (12 to 18 months payments rolled forward each time) 
reschedulings have been concluded, e.g. for Zaire and the Sudan. Each has had 
elaborate conditionality and monitoring. Their defects include: the massive 
misallocation of debtor personnel time required to monitor, report, confer, 
renegotiate them; gross under-financing (even on paper) of accompanying new 
financial packages; total absence of lender performance monitoring; overall 
macro-economic assumptions which are - taken together - frequently so 
optimistic as to make the arrangements about as stable as a house of cards in 
a typhoon.
While Paris Club reschedulings now usually follow a consultative group 
financing meeting, they are not institutionally linked to it. -More seriously, 
they rarely provide even short term debt service burden reduction equal to the 
amounts set down - by the same governments wearing their consultative group 
(or con group?) hats - in the macro-economic and balance of payments 
projections agreed by the group and very often authored by the World Bank. 
The World Bank has explicitly blamed at least one adjustment programme 
collapse - Zambia 1984 - on this non-coordination.
The IMF does not formally reschedule but in practice seems to have become 
locked in with respect to its larger SSA drawers. The only way most of them - 
e.g. Ghana - can repurchase on time is likely to be by immediately redrawing. 
While this may maximise long term IMF influence, it is a peculiar way either 
to provide long term structural adjustment or short term bridging finance. In
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the better funded structural adjustment programmes - e.g. Ghana - heavy IMF 
drawings in early years are used to cover a general lag in initial bilateral 
pledging and disbursement but from year four on (when the grace period 
expires) IMF scheduled repurchases tend to be similar to the projected 
financing gap.
As a result, the IMF seems rather disposed to use its Structural Adjustment 
Fund (retreaded Trust Fund with concessional interest rates and longer 
repayment periods) primarily to refinance part of maturing standby drawings, 
which is arguably not the most efficient allocation. It does admittedly 
reduce pressure on both the Fund and the borrower, albeit the Fund is now 
seeking tougher conditionality on SAF use than on second credit tranche 
drawings, which is not what most observers believed to be the intent when SAF 
was created.
Commercial arrears have proven to be a very costly form of external borrowing. 
In extreme cases they have the result of forcing an economy to revert to cash 
payments on or before arrival or to externally confirmed letters of credit 
fully offset by counter deposits. Even more generally they result in premiums 
of up to 30/S on goods sent on credit because of non- or delayed payment risk 
with consequential losses of principal or extra interest charges for the un- 
or late paid seller.
They have also proven to be almost impossible to reschedule except in respect 
to insured arrears taken over by government export credit guarantee agencies 
which have been covered under the Paris Club umbrella. Nigeria did negotiate 
rescheduling, but the agreement broke down within two years in a welter of 
principal and amortisation defaults. The initial problem with rescheduling is 
the number of creditors but the ultimate one is cost. Many SSA economies have 
outstanding commercial arrears of 50% to over 10056 of annual export earnings. 
The best terms an SSA team is likely to be able to negotiate are 6% to 10% 
interest on remaining balance, 2 years grace, and 6 years to pay consolidation 
notes substituted for the arrears. But in year three, the interest (6-1056) 
and amortisation ( 16.2/356) on a 10056 of exports arrears backlog would raise 
the external debt service ratio by 22.6756 to 36.67% of export earnings. That 
is hardly a position likely to prove tenable for the debtor.
Do-it-yourself reschedulings have been rare and with one special exception
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rather unsatisfactory. Nigeria's attempt to reschedule (especially on short 
term bank lines of credit and on commercial arrears) and to set a 30% to 40% 
of export earnings debt service to exports cap, without a prior Fund (or Bank) 
agreement rapidly unravelled.
A more common form of do-it-yourself has been semi-selective massive run-up of 
arrears on medium and long term debt service, as a semi-condoned partial 
default or debt service cap. While one may suspect some of the run-ups 
represented inability to manage rather than conscious management, others - 
e.g. Tanzania from 1982 - were seen as interim debt service burden limitation 
tactics. This approach has in several cases bought time but it is hard to see 
how at least the commercial arrears portion of the overhang can be unwound. 
That problem is even more acute when - as in Sudan, Zambia and Liberia - 
substantial repurchase arrears with the IMF block a new IMF agreement until 
cleared and thereby, as a second step, block any general, formal rescheduling.
Zimbabwe did manage a "take it or leave it" rescheduling in 1984 which was
both inventive and largely successful. It related to blocked balances
awaiting remittance at some unspecified future date which prior to that point 
could be deposited - at up to 15% in 1984 - and the interest remitted
immediately. These were converted into 4% government stock with 8 to 12 years 
maturity. The net present value, as well as the current debt service, were 
evidently very sharply reduced so that the official presentation of the 
measures as safeguarding convertibility of interest and liquidation of 
principal would appear to be a none too subtle piece of sarcasm. Amazingly 
the creditors - and even financial journals - accepted this rescheduling with 
little adverse comment.
In addition the blocked balances could be used to finance approved domestic 
investment - cle facto a form of equitisation. In that event dividends (as on 
all post September 1979 approved foreign equity investment) would be 
remittable.
The reason for external acceptance would appear to be the history of the 
specific debts (or arrears) in question. They represented interest, rent, 
dividend and amortisation or asset liquidation payments due under the illegal 
Rhodesian regime which were blocked by that regime's exchange controls. 
Zimbabwe's initial 1980 action of allowing interest on them to be remitted was
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actually a significant liberalisation. Because of their origins and the total 
inconvertibility of principal and interest from the mid-1960s to 1980, it is 
likely that these arrears were considered to be a special case and that 
similar treatment of other external debts (by Zimbabwe or any other SSA state) 
would not be received equally benignly.
Since 1984 Zimbabwe has been seeking to avoid a standard Paris Club 
rescheduling - at least partly because with a large budgetary deficit which is 
primarily the counterpart of defence expenditure imposed by South African 
aggression against Zimbabwe and its neighbours, an IMF agreement on standard 
terms is seen by Zimbabwe as dangerously inappropriate to its circumstances. 
The result of this stance, very limited concessional finance flows, a 1980-82 
post-independence borrowing spree and a 1984 on strategy of accepting only 
quite concessional or very long term loans has created a debt service crunch. 
If Zimbabwe could achieve a moderate current account surplus through 1990, the 
repayment hump would be over but the price of doing that would be drastic 
intermediate and capital goods imports cuts, quite possibly reducing output by 
up to 20%.
While the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has always perceived debt service as an 
absolute prior claim to imports, the Ministry of Finance does not fully agree.
Faced with substantial declines in forex available for allocation to 
enterprises in the first half of 1987 (and an economy already constrained to 
near stagnation of output by 1986 cuts) it has begun to negotiate about £ 160 
million of six year libor plus 1 commercial bank loans, de facto to replace 
maturing 1980-82 commercial bank and supplier credit finance. This buys time 
while Zimbabwe seeks to sort out major World Bank export sector development 
and finance loans caught up in the debate over macro-economic policies 
including the defence related deficit and restructuring loss making 
parastatals (basically railways, steel and agricultural marketing - the last 
two on export but not domestic sales).
In the meantime Zimbabwe is steadily repaying its IMF drawings and propose to 
liquidate them. It argues that six year 8% money is not particularly
desirable and, perhaps more convincing, that it needs to restore first line
liquidity to have it available when a genuine shock (e.g. drought) impact
needs to be bridged. The peculiarity is that the Fund, Bank and several
bilaterals oppose this apparently orthodox approach to the use of Fund credit
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presumably because it would limit macro-economic conditionality leverage 
especially if Zimbabwe sought neither a SAP nor a Paris Club rescheduling.
Tanzania’s alternative strategy approaches have related much more to 
adjustment than to rescheduling as such. Until 1984 they were somewhat hard 
to decipher because internal dialogue blunted their thrust. Their chief 
differences from standard versions appear to turn on avoidance, where 
practicable, of massive shocks; institutionalisation of small, frequent 
changes (e.g. in respect to the exchange rate, a sector in which Tanzania has 
adopted an approach very similar to Zimbabwe's); protection of mass access 
basic services and lower income households; priority for rehabilitation over 
new projects (now conventional wisdom but not so in 1979 when Tanzania first 
emphasised it), a very high priority to avoiding major inflationary pressures 
and determination to avoid if at all possible rates above 30Í while seeing 10Í 
as a short to medium (3 year) target.
By 1985 it had adopted two further planks - basing its external finance 
package on an articulated projection of import requirements for rehabilitation 
and 4^  annual growth beyond those financeable from export earnings and 
reaching agreement with the Bank and bilaterals on firm financial commitments 
before seriously seeking to reach final agreement with the Fund.
Tanzania eschewed rescheduling attempts - other than partial, semi-condoned 
building up of arrears - prior to 1986 for two reasons. In the absence of an 
IMF agreement a Paris Club one clearly could not be obtained and in any event 
a 12 to 18 month roll-forward would need constant renegotiation. In 1986 
Tanzania shifted its stance because consultative group pledges fell short of 
meeting minimum import requirements by the order of $300 million (or nearly 
3056 of the import target) and the consultative group was willing to call for a 
multi-year rescheduling.
Tanzania's proposals for ten years roll-forward of interest and principal 
payments including arrears - i.e. all 1985-1995 service on Paris Club covered 
debt - with repayment spread over the next ten years were serious ones but 
proved non-negotiable. However it did get arrears and 1 98 6/ 8 7 principal and 
interest payments rolled forward (to the extent of 97.5Í of all payments 
otherwise due including arrears) with five years grace and five to repay (i.e. 
repayment over 1992-2002). While a new roll-forward of 1987-1997 (or 2002)
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payments on these loans will fairly clearly be needed, one year guaranteed and 
two more implicitly promised on the same terms if the 1987 and 1988 
Consultative Group meetings so recommend, was seen as a long enough initial 
breathing space to be worth agreeing upon, especially as the 19 8 6 /8 7 reduction 
of debt service was estimated as of the order of $276 million (almost 70Í of 
probable visible export earnings).
Preludes To Negotiations - Regional
OAU efforts to organise an SSA-Creditor regional debt conference to agree 
guidelines for rescheduling/partial writedown/new funds allocation have not 
succeeded to date. The 1986 General Assembly Special Session was on African 
economy in general, not external debt in particular. Proposals to Special 
Session did call for at least $35-40 billion rescheduling to complement $45 
billion new money over 1986-90 but did not make the total of $80-85 billion 
(of $125 billion proposed total fixed investment) external support clear to 
the reader. In the event - unlike most of the rest of proposals - the debt 
ones (as a result of a de facto OECD, Latin American, Socialist European
’coalition' of very different objections) were not adopted in General Assembly
Resolution. That resolution does recognise the existence of a debt problem 
but its only creditor commitment is to avoid net financial transfers from an 
SSA economy to a creditor economy.
There have been some subsequent responses. One has been to seek to set up a 
monitoring system to cover creditor as well as debtor performance (more 
generally North as well as SSA peformance) since the resolution is in 
quasi-contractual form. Some confusion has arisen as UNDP - using the World 
Bank as its contractor - appears to view itself as the logical monitoring
agency while the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development 
Bank and most African states think a World Bank/ECA or World Bank/ADB
monitoring team would be more appropriate.
EEC countries have responded with - and gained OECD blessing for - longer 
grace periods and repayment phasing up to perhaps ten plus ten years subject 
to some (apparently not necessarily IMF) policy conditionality. There is also 
broad agreement on the need to lower interest rates which would apply 
primarily to export credits and other non-ODA loans. While the EEC favours
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retrospective conversion of development loans to grants for poor SSA countries 
this is still not favoured by the two major OECD members - USA, Japan - who 
have not done it already.
A related French proposal deals with rescheduled payments due and not actually 
payable. To protect the Paris Club principle of never rescheduling the same 
payment twice, it is proposed to set up a special IMF "disindebtment" 
facility. This would presumably be on concessional and long repayment terms - 
how it is to be financed is somewhat less clear.
Attempts - surprisingly by the usually cautiously conservative UMOA (the West 
African CFA franc states) - to create a united front representation to the 
Bank/Fund have been deferred. However, Zimbabwe Finance Minister Bernard 
Chidzero has used his Development Committee chairmanship to push the African 
debt term lengthening and interest lowering case, one which appears to be 
gaining a more favourable hearing since the middle of 1986.
A Review Of Negotiations To Date
Most SSA external debt renegotiations have been aimed at preventing import 
strangulation. In some cases, e.g. the Cote d’Ivoire, this end was sought 
before massive arrears had been piled up or imports had been cut below the 
minimum levels necessary to operate the economy. In others - e.g. Nigeria - 
it was taken after a crisis had recently broken out with arrears piling up and 
imports falling away but before a process of decline had taken firm hold. A 
third set of cases, e.g. Zambia, came well after such a process had taken hold 
with arrears very high, imports very low and even 90 day commercial (bank or 
other) trade credit virtually a thing of the past. A final category, e.g. the 
Sudan involves repeated reschedulings following the failure of successive 
previous ones to yield a breathing space or even approximate retoration of 
debt service.
Intellectually there has been a shift to defining goals in terms of the 
amount, period of deferral, grace period and repayment period which would 
provide time and economic space to restore imports, economic growth and 
(usually less articulatedly spelled out) exports adequate to resuming debt 
service. In fact this goal has rarely been acceptable to creditors so that,
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while partially reflected in the 1986 Tanzania Paris Club agreement, it is 
more prominent in submissions such as that of the OAU to the 1986 United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on SSA than in actual reschedulings.
Quite frankly the majority of the reschedulings have been viewed as buying 
time - usually a little time - by debtors and creditors. Neither usually 
really believed they solved the problem, but they did avert collapse and 
provide a few quarters for something good to turn up.
The reduction in gross transfers of financial resources payable in debt 
service as a proportion of exports have usually been in the 15% to 25% range 
during the effective period which has usually been one and one half to three 
years. However, five years roll-forward and an initial reduction in gross 
external debt service of over two thirds of visible exports has been achieved 
in the 1986 Tanzania rescheduling.
The present discounted value of the future debt service streams has in general 
been reduced by 10 to 20% because most of the debt rescheduled has been 
government to government or government guaranteed export credits with interest 
rates rather to substantially below commercial levels. Because grace periods 
have tended to be limited (up to five years) as have those for repayment 
(usually not in excess of five years after the grace period) the time profile 
of external debt and the repayment hump in it has been rolled forward more 
than lengthened. No significant gains have been made on the financial terms 
of commercial borrowings - indeed on balance they have worsened. That result 
is all the greater in cases in which non-interest bearing arrears have been 
consolidated into interest bearing notes, e.g. Nigeria.
Private sector external loans are a relatively small portion of SSA external 
debt. Apart from a handful protected by external escrow accounts, e.g. to 
Valeo (Volta power and aluminium) and Mobil Zaire (offshore oil field) they 
have probably fared about as well or badly as official or officially 
guaranteed state enterprise borrowing. In general SSA states have not taken 
on obligations to repay if the private borrower is unable to meet the local 
currency equivalent of debt service due. However, in the case of commercial 
arrears there have been cases - e.g. Nigeria - of substituting a government 
obligation for a private sector one, but more because the private borrower had 
discharged his obligation in local currency but remittance to the creditor had
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not been possible then because the state accepted liability for unpaid, 
non-guaranteed private (or parastatal) debts.
Almost all Paris Club and the post 1980 commercial bank renegotiations have 
been tied to an IMF upper credit tranche agreement as a pre-condition for 
opening negotiations. Since 1982 there has generally - but not universally - 
been a link to a World Bank structural adjustment programme. Indeed in two 
1986 cases - Tanzania and Nigeria - the basic agreement was with the Bank and 
the Fund one was consequential on it.
The amount of adjustment required is hard to measure empirically. Because 
most agreements since 1970 have been in a context of import strangulation, 
increased imports, reduced gross debt service and increased gross inflows 
(largely on concessional terms at least in principle) have been standard goals 
even on the part of creditors. The devaluation, credit expansion limitation 
and government bank financing requirement reduction goals have usually been 
quite stringent. The partial exceptions - e.g. Tanzania 1986 - have been ones 
in which substantial action had been taken nationally prior to actual Bank, 
Fund or Paris Club negotiations.
The snag is that the amount and period of adjustment upward of possible 
imports has usually been self-evidently too low and too short to allow 
restoration of growth and of sustaining it after resumption of debt service. 
In several cases quite clearly the fact that rolling repayment forward solves 
nothing because a substantial portion can never again be serviced has been 
quite deliberately fudged.
The deals to date have - with few exceptions - been good only in terms of 
objectives defined as putting collapse or at least rapid economic decline a 
few quarters forward. Even in that sense some have been unsuccessful, e.g. 
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan and earlier Zambia and Zaire reschedulings. The 
main causes were lack of options - or of a clear negotiating position based on 
coherent medium terra projects and strategies - on the SSA side and a lack of 
willingness to set precedents or accept that much of the debt was irrevocably 
bad on the lenders’ side. The World Bank has sought to redress this imbalance 
by providing scenarios, but the Paris Club has been rather unwilling to accept 
their implications as to length of rescheduling, grace, repayment let alone 
increased conditionality and/or open partial or full writeoffs.
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Whether most of the deals served anybody's interests is a moot point. In 
general at the end of the day the debtors had heavier debt burdens and lower 
real imports and the creditors more debt outstanding and in quasi-default and 
lower real exports to the debtors. Commercial banks in some cases, e.g. Cote 
d'Ivoire, Kenya, Gabon, Mauritius have been able to claw down their exposure 
and in others, e.g. Sudan, Zaire, Zambia have had more time to write it down 
gradually by setting up reserves over a period of years.
A Background And Contextual Review Of Results
Most SSA governments - reading World Bank, IMF and OECD forecasts - expected 
1979/80 to be followed by a rapid recovery (analagous to that following 
1974/75). This did lead to ex post imprudence in borrowing - especially
borrowing short - and in running up trade credit arrears and IMF drawings to 
"ride out" the storm. Whether it really affected most rescheduling
approaches is unclear - they were in large measure desperate crisis management 
(or juggling) sorties rather than reasoned bridges to recovery attempts. The 
handful of pre-1979 substantial users of commercial bank credit - e.g. Cote 
d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Gabon - may have hoped for 
resumption of normal lending by the banks up to, say, 1982 but probably did 
not put much faith in it, especially as they could hardly afford to use much
more of such expensive money.
At one level net transfers have influenced or even dominated tactics. Because 
SSA as a whole has (including grant aid) a positive overall financial resource 
transfer position, true go-it-alone positions have been very rare. The one 
true exception was Nigeria over 19 8 3 - 8 5 when it was making unilateral
proposals from a position of net resource ouflows. By 1986 its (oil) exports 
had fallen so sharply in import capacity terras that it felt forced to turn to 
rescheduling on an agreed basis plus massive World Bank borrowing to approach 
an ex ante balanced financial transfer position. The Sudan's nominal 
following of Peru's approach is slightly unreal - the Sudan was not actually
paying as much as it promised, has been unable to meet its own ceiling (i.e.
to pay that much) and is hopelessly in default to the IMF.
In a different sense falling net inward transfers and limited debt
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renegotiation prospects (at least through 1985) have led some countries - 
notably Tanzania - to use quasi-condoned arrears buildup as an alternative to 
formal rescheduling so long as it did not affect grant bilateral aid. In 
these cases World Bank - and less uniformly IMF - service has had priority to 
achieve inflows from the Bank and to keep open the possibility of a subsequent 
agreement with the Fund.
SSA states until 1984 at the earliest were not very creative in proposing 
non-standard debt reschedulings. Those that saw them as necessary, like 
Tanzania, also viewed them as unattainable and preferred semi-condoned, 
quasi-default to even nore unsatisfactory Paris Club model reschedulings which 
would have broken down as soon as grace periods began to expire if not before. 
The OAU submission to the Special Session and the Tanzania Paris Club 
proposals in 1986 do represent a more innovative and assertive stance. Both 
tend to concentrate on long (five to ten year) interest, arrears and principle 
rollforwards with at least five years grace on each rolled amount and ten 
years subsequent repayment. Interest rate reductions have not featured 
equally prominently in these proposals and write-offs have been posed as a 
challenge to the handful of major governments (USA, Japan, USSR) who have not 
acted on the 1979 agreemnt to convert loans to low income economies 
retrospectively into grants.
These post 1984 proposals arguably attempt to make a virtue out of weakness 
and smallness. That is they argue that unless SSA is to remain forever 
dependent on emergency aid, forever in danger of starvation, forever a 
shrinking export market for creditors and forever prone to extreme insecurity, 
then, both massively larger concessional resource inflows and very substantial 
grace periods on over half external debt payments are needed. Without them 
rehabilitation, recovery and structural adjustment to higher earned import 
(export) levels are seen as unattainable.
Pressure for open unilateral action has rarely been high. This is partly 
because mass public opinion on this type of issue is rarely mobilised in SSA 
and partly because unilateral action - except debt service capping to spread 
out a repayment hump as in Nigeria - was usually perceived by those looking at 
the issue as likely to reduce inflows more than outflows. In other words the 
cost/benefit analysis tended to be negative. Pressure for de facto unilateral 
action, i.e. can’t pay, don’t pay, has been more common and when governments
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beleived it would be condoned (especially by commercial non-bank trade 
creditors and export credit agencies) has been effective, but perhaps more 
often because it pushed on an open door than because it changed government 
minds.
Some Salient Characteristics Of Rescheduling
No SSA economy has secured a rescheduling without a prior IMF agreement. The 
supposed Nigerian exception is unreal - Nigeria did negotiate a standby on 
higher credit tranche terms but for a maximum drawing level of zero. Tanzania 
in 1986 negotiated an agreement with the World Bank which also convened a 
consultative group meeting before an IMF agreement was reached. While this 
sequence clearly led to modifications in the Fund’s position, it did not 
affect the Paris Club's insistence that the agreement be in place before a 
recheduling meeting could be convened.
Clear alternative adjustment strategies have not been very common in SSA. 
Ghana’s in 1982 caved in as did Tanzania's over 1981-84. Zimbabwe's has 
precluded a new Fund agreement and imperilled the World Bank's financing new 
programmes which, taken by themselves, it actually endorses. Nigeria's and 
Tanzania's alternative strategies - and their apparent ability to persevere in 
them despite costs - do appear to have resulted in somewhat less conventional 
IMF agreements; less dependence on short term high interest IMF finance; a 
greater share of World Bank finance (on Bank terms for Nigeria and IDA for 
Tanzania) and - perhaps - somewhat less limited easing of short to medium term 
debt service burdens than have typified other reschedulings. But both have 
been quite tough in their overall adjustment packages even though Tanzania has 
insisted on and won considerably more flexibility in timing, a near avoidance 
of an overtly externally imposed initial "big shock" adjustment and a bias in 
expenditure toward basic services for poor people.
The cost of winning some independence of structuring adjustment was high for 
Nigeria and Tanzania and remains high for Zimbabwe. Whether the freedom of 
manoeuvre won will recover the cost remains to be seen. In the case of both 
Nigeria and Tanzania the alternative strategy clearly could not be made to 
work without an additional import capacity from reduced debt service outflows 
and/or increased financial inflows. But because both states appeared willing
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and to some degree able to struggle on without a conventional rescheduling, 
mounted energetic (if not very successful) real external and fiscal deficit 
reduction programmes and did adjust prices (including the exchange rate) 
significantly and on a processual, not a one off, basis the Bank and the 
bilateral sources came to see their efforts as worth backing and the Fund, 
rather more grudgingly, went along.
This would not have worked however had either wanted large IMF drawings. 
Nigeria will not in fact draw under its standby. It has negotiated toward 
borrowing comparable amounts at similar interest rates but with longer grace 
and repayment periods from the World Bank. Tanzania’s drawings are also low 
for the start up of a structural adjustment programme. In effect they are to 
retire a bridging loan taken to clear arrears to the IMF and to reduce arrears 
to international financial institutions. For their own reasons neither state 
wanted any substantial proportion of new inflows to be IMF resources.
Debt rescheduling as opposed to devaluation - has rarely been highly 
politicised in SSA except in the sense of affirming that debt service does not 
have a higher priority than averting starvation. Devaluation has been 
politicised, but possibly more in a mirror image macho response of "no 
devaluation, now or ever" in reaction to the IMF's apparent "devaluation is 
good for your soul and cures all ills" recipe than as a genuinely internal 
debate. Certainly that seems to have been the case both in Nigeria and 
Tanzania in which rather rapid initial and subsequent sliding devaluation 
proved politically attainable and sustainable once it could be seen as backed 
by a domestic case and not as a response to IMF demands. Rescheduling 
decisions and negotiating parameters have in almost all cases been taken/set 
up by a limited number of ministers, senior officials and expatriate advisors 
in Treasuries and Central Banks. In some cases these may have been teleguided 
by hired merchant bank advisors, but the degree to which their influence went 
further than tactics and data organisation ia a moot point - the banks and the 
Treasuries/Central Banks, perhaps predictably, tell quite different stories.
Oddly the most politicised rescheduling - or at any rate rolling over - case 
is Zimbabwe which has not rescheduled. The internal lineup is not stable - 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe has for some years seen external debt service and 
external debt reduction as absolute priorities, while enterprises (who face 
reduced import allocations) back either rescheduling or replacement borrowing
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with Finance and Planning holding the balance and apparently somewhat variable 
on how much import - and thus output - reduction it is willing to pay to "get
over the external debt hump".
i
I
The "precedent" argument is beginning to fall away in SSA. SSA is now 
perceived as a continent in structural economic crisis requiring special 
treatment. Admittedly this is a government rather than a commercial bank 
perception and is only now approaching possible implementation so far as debt 
rescheduling is concerned. However, creditor government and government 
guaranteed loans are dominant in SSA and commercial banks might follow a Paris 
Club lead. That is a plausible scenario at least in cases - e.g. Sudan, 
Zambia, Zaire - in which they know that standard approaches will fail to 
secure even full interest service much less debt repayment unless in fact 
grant aid is used for that purpose which is unlikely.
Arguably the Tanzanian and Nigerian deals are significantly better than 
average - especially if macro and sectoral adjustment freedom of manoeuvre is 
taken into account. Because of the cost of holding out until they were 
achieved it is unclear how many governments will choose to seek to follow them 
if citing their parameters as precedents does not by itself produce some 
softening of terms. A government needs to perceive itself as having a strong 
support base (military in Nigeria, mass in Tanzania) to venture down that 
road. Learning has probably been largely from what went wrong with other 
countries' reschedulings (too little, too late, too short) but only in 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe has this evidently influenced strategy and tactics. 
Both have chosen to delay formal debt rescheduling proposals until they 
believed they had the rest of an adequate financial resource transfer package 
in place i.e. Zimbabwe is still formally resisting the idea of a Paris Club 
rescheduling.
Until 1985 it is hard to argue that rescheduling terms changed much either 
continentally or for individual states. From 1985 there are some signs that 
World Bank and consultative group projections of short to medium term debt 
service reductions necessary to allow structural adjustment are influencing 
the Paris Club toward longer rollforward, grace and repayment periods and may 
in the future result in some concessions on interest rates.
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Selected Issues and Targets: National
From the balance of payments projections the 18 to 20 most seriously indebted
SSA economies the following appear to be the minimum conditions for a stable 
rescheduling which would have a good chance of holding up without a series of 
subsequent additional reschedulings:
1. all official arrears plus five years (in the worst affected eighteen ten 
years) of principal and interest payments to be rolled forward;
2. the grace period on each rescheduled payment to be ten years;
3. repayment to be phased over the ten years following expiry of the grace 
period;
*1. interest on all rescheduled items to be held to 3% or the initial rate
whichever is lower i.e. a reduction of 50 to 67% in guaranteed or
governmental export credit rates.
5. at least for the low income category (defined either in World Bank terms
or more broadly as under $1,000 per capita in 1984) past development
loans to be converted into retrospective grants by the USA, Japan,
CMEA countries and - for the SSA debtor countries in respect to which 
conversion have not yet been made - Federal Germany.
6. and at least some export and supplier credits (especially those
supporting inherently unsatisfactory projects) to be written off (as 
Sweden has done in the case of Tanzania).
Rather less drastic steps may be adequate for middle income countries whose 
bottom line problems are a hump in their debt profiles and, in several cases, 
a heavy backlog of commercial arrears. Roll forwards of three to five years 
annual principal (but possibly not interest) with repayment over the next 
seven to ten might well be enough for e.g. Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria.
Formula related debt service or more accurately formulae with trigger points 
setting off rescheduling would be useful. However, a tie of gross debt 
service to export earnings is too blunt an instrument. At least two measures
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would be needed - gross debt service to exports and net financial resource
inflows relative to GDP or GDP per capita.
Commercial arrears whether to financial or new financial institutions need to 
be consolidated and rescheduled. The problem is that in the cases in which 
they are large no very satisfactory way forward now exists. 6% interest two 
years grace plus six years repayment packages would consolidate but without 
good luck would quickly slide into de facto default again - vide Nigeria. 2%
five plus five year rescheduling could not be imposed unless the main
bilateral sources and the World Bank gave that approach at least a nihil 
obstat and preferably a positive endorsement - which is far from the case 
today. Refinancing by use of IMF drawings amounts to consolidation into &%, 
three plus three year obligations and - if pursued systematically - can easily 
use up all attainable IMF drawings. There may be a case for letting such 
arrears remain, paying all new import bills on time and waiting for a more 
prosperous context to launch serious rescheduling talks on this component of 
external debt.
To operate debt management convincingly enough to encourage creditors, to 
agree to multi year or quasi automatic successive 18 month reschedulings 
requires much fuller and more accessible data than most SSA states have. That 
data needs to be held in a form allowing simple programming of new debt levels 
in local currencies, SDR’s or USA dollars when exchange rates alter - a test 
many present recording and retrieval systems do not pass.
Regional Initiatives: Toward Ambiances and Guidelines
Individual SSA economies are not large enough nor individual SSA governments 
audible (nor well staffed enough) to argue the macro (or mega) economic case 
for larger reschedulings, interest rate reductions and partial, selective 
writeoffs. To create a climate of opinion open to such proposals is a process 
which the 1985 OAU economic summit and the 1986 Special Session may have begun 
albeit more in putting across the general economic malaise and African states 
determination to take a lead in restructuring than in respect to external debt 
and its rescheduling as such.
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Guideline formulation - and dialogue with OECD, CMEA, OPEC and large South 
economy creditors - is an area for regional coordination. The first step 
would be for SSA states to agree on negotiable guidelines. The ECA, ADB or 
Centre for African Monetary Studies (or all three) could provide inputs 
including data and options. The OAU would probably be the most appropriate 
conference convenor, but the three specialist bodies would need to staff the 
professional levels of its secretariat.
Negotiable guidelines will probably need to be differentiated. GDP and 
external debt per capita, adequacy of import levels and debt service/exports 
ratios, degree of import strangulation and gaps between actual and nominally 
possible production and population and output growth should probably be among 
the organising characteristics.
Presentationally SSA/Africa needs a clearcut, simple approach backed by 
respectable data summaries and technical annexes. But it also needs 
spokespersons and a team - of significantly less than fifty one - to carry on 
dialogue in actual working groups which would presumably then report back to a 
larger, higher level body empowered to promulgate the guidelines. Whether 
that body should be UNCTAD’s Trade and Development Committee, the Fund/Bank 
Development Committee or the UN General or ECOSOC Assembly requires further 
consideration.
Regionally, greater monitoring capacity in respect to creditors is needed - 
few African countries can monitor creditor action in a timely way and ECA or 
OAU should be able to gain economies of scale. However, there is still not 
full acceptance that monitoring should be a two way process with 
representatives or organisations of both creditors and debtors participating.
Where Now? A Tactical Review
1. SSA needs substantial de facto writeoffs for up to 20 economies. Whether 
they are to be higher levels of very concessional or grant aid used to 
repay harder loans (e.g. IMF Trust Fund credits to repay normal 
drawings); open writeoffs (as with Sweden taking over payment of 
commercial loans to Tanzania from its enterprise sector or the USA and 
Japan adopting the consensus on retrospective grant aid to the least
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developed/other low income); and/or rescheduling with long grace and 
repayment periods and reduced interest which combine to reduce net 
present value significantly is secondary.
2. For a much broader group of countries - who may need rescheduling for 
fairly extended periods plus modest concessions on interest not wholesale 
writeoffs on medium and long term obligations - some means to achieve 
practicable rescheduling management for commercial arrears is needed. 
What is practicable varies from the generally insolvent to the 
substantially illiquid and also depends on how willing Consultative 
Groups and the Paris Club (hopefully merged for SSA reconstruction and 
rehabilitation work) are to accept substantial use of forex to clear 
these arrears, necessarily at the price of further deferring official 
debt service or of increasing the minimum levels of new money needed. 
The import cost, trade finance and routing convenience and even 
availability costs of operating with substantial levels of such arrears 
are so high that this topic deserves far more attention - especially by 
creditor governments - than it has received to date.
3. SSA is so small that to have the weight to negotiate guidelines for 
external debt reconstruction (indeed to call attention to the fact its 
concerns really do have an objective counterpart in the interests of 
creditor economies) it needs to achieve a form of SSA (perhaps under OAU 
serviced by ADB and ECA auspices) - Creditor (including Bank/Fund) 
strategic negotiations. These would seek to:
a. agree on parameters of problem as they confront different actors; 
and
b. on requirements for resolving it acceptably to all (or most) 
actors; as well as
c. instruments for doing so; for
d. two to four categories of economy (e.g. hopelessly indebted low 
and lower middle income, over-indebted lower middle income, 
temporarily insolvent lower middle income, viable);
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e. define criteria for categorisation and application of
instruments.
4. How to achieve the above needs articulation. For example, a one off all 
actor conference by itself (as opposed to a series of working groups and 
consultations leading to a broadly agreed package presented to such a
conference for ratification) is not a realistic way forward. Any single 
meeting would almost certainly be incompletely factually grounded on both 
sides and would also probably begin from very different - and partly 
inaccurate - perceptions by all actors both of their own and others'
interests and possible areas of overlapping interest. Therefore it would 
hardly be likely to be adequate for reaching an articulated set of
operational decisions. However, an initial commitment to go beyond mere 
consultation and an interim one as to principles to be worked out are 
probably needed to get the process started and to underpin its actually 
producing results not an unending series of interim reports.
5. The process - for both political practicability and technical feasability 
reasons - needs to be presented, and actually viewed, as a complement to 
country level negotiations setting a set of parameters within which such 
country negotiations are to take place and as a central monitoring point 
for negotiations, agreements, implementations and results rather than as 
a substitute for them. Nobody envisages a single negotiation covering 
the diverse (and to a substantial extent unknown) external debt of forty 
odd economies and arriving at directly implementable results for each. 
The sooner this is made clear, the sooner partly misinformed and partly 
disinformed opposition to general regional negotiations as such can be 
ended and debate focused on real issues.
6. SSA negotiations and agreements on principle for categories of debtors 
should be defined formally as having no direct linkage to other regions 
and categories. (By demanding such linkage at the 1986 General Assembly 
Special Session the Latin American states in effect ensured that OECD and 
CMEA creditor country opposition to including any formal forward progress 
on SSA's external debt in the final resolution would prevail.) The 
linkage value will, in fact, exist but by analogy and more for the 
Bolivia's, probably the Paraguay's and perhaps the Peru's, not the
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Mexico’s or the Brazil’s. Logically the OAU and the Cartagena Group 
might usefully have an early technical level meeting followed by a joint 
ministerial one to reach an agreed modus vivendi in this area.
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SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook, October 1985.
a. Countries that obtained at least two-thirds of their external borrowings from commercial sources 
from 1978 to 1982.
b. Countries with no rescheduling and no external arrears during 1980-85.
c. Countries that obtained two-thirds or more of their external borrowings from official creditors 
from 1978 to 1982.
d. Countries that obtained at least one-third o f their external borrowing from both commercial and 
official creditors in 1978-82.
e. Low-income countries included in World Bank study referred to by Agarwala.
TABLE 2 INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM 
EXTERNAL DEBT RELATIVE TO EXPORTS AND TO GDP, 1978-85*
(percentage)
________________________________ 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 .1 9 8 3  1984 1985
Ratio o f  external debt to 
exports o f  goods and 
servicesb 
Indebted developing
countries 132.4 120.4 110.4 122.8 148.6 159.0 153.0 160.1
Éy region
Africa' 124.2 106.6 87.6 112.3 148.6 164.7 167.7 166.0
Asia 81.0 74.1 70.0 71.5 84.0 89.2 84.1 92.1
Europe 126.8 118.4 117.9 114.7 122.8 139.5 126.0 131.1
Nonoil Middle East 161.5 154.4 127.7 139.9 162.8 195.7 204.8 225.3
Western Hemisphere 217.2 197.8 182.8 208.8 267.2 288.2 273.9 289.4
By predominant export
Primary product exporters 180.2 164.5 157.7 190.5 237.7 253.2 250.5 262.7
Exporters of manufactures 
Service and remittance
69.7 68.9 65.8 62.1 66.9 68.4 62.4 65.6
countries 144.7 131.2 115.2 129.4 155.4 178.0 188.8 214.9
By financial criteria
Market borrowers 126.1 112.6 102.8 117.7 146.5 154.8 146.7 151.1
Official borrowers 162.2 152.2 155.9 178.5 2)5.2 239.2 258.6 275.1
Diversified borrowers 140.8 135.0 120.6 121.7 133.8 146.9 142.7 155.0
%TABLE 2 INDEBTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: LONG-TERM AND SHORT-TERM 
( c o n t ' d )  EXTERNAL DEBT RELATIVE TO EXPORTS AND TO GDP. 1978-85*
(percentage) (continued)
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Countries with recent debt 
servicing problema 179.1 162.9 148.9 180.2 234.5 252.8 244.6 255.7
Countries without debt 
servicing problems 94.8 85.5 77.3 78.0 88.6 95.8 93.0 100.6
By miscellaneous criteria 
Small low-income countries 225.5 220.4 222.6 269.4 320.9 334.6 344.5 375.4
Sub-Saharan Africa 99.3 93.1 82.4 116.7 167.7 200.8 193.7 203.0
By alternative analytical 
categories 
Nonoil developing 
countries 131.6 122.0 114.6 127.1 151.4 159.6 154.3 161.3
Net oil exporters 180.6 149.7 133.9 165.0 206.6 218.9 207.0 226.4
Net oil importer* 123.0 116.5 110.5 118.9 139.5 146.8 142.7 148.0
Ratio o f  external debt to C D Pk 
Indebted developing
countries 25.6 25.4 25.7 28.8 32.9 35.6 36.3 36.7
By region 
Africa 32.4 30.3 26.6 30.5 35.9 38.0 39.9 40.8
Asia 15.9 16.1 16.5 18.3 20.9 22.0 22.8 25.1
Europe 23.7 21.4 25.6 28.9 30.3 35.1 39.4 39.6
Nonoil Middle East 52.9 62.9 59.1 62.0 65.7 67.1 69.6 69.4
Western Hemisphere 31.8 27.2 28.4 32.0 43.1 48.1 46.8 45.4
By predominant export 
Primary product exporters 29.7 25.5 26.9 31.3 40.4 42.9 44.6 46.9
Exporters of manufacturer 14.5 14.9 15.6 16.8 17.8 18.1 18.5 19.2
Service and remittance 
countries 32.8 35.7 37.1 42.2 48.2 52.6 55.6 59.4
By financial criteria 
Market borrowers 29.7 26.6 27.0 30.0 37.9 42.4 41.8 41.9
Official borrowers 31.9 32.2 33.1 38.6 42.5 44.3 49.3 55.5
Diversified borrowers 16.9 17.2 17.3 19.5 21.3 21.8 23.5 24.8
Countries with recent debt- 
servicing problems 31.3 27.9 28.7 33.3 42.6 47.5 47.6 47.4
Countries without debt- 
servicing problems 20.1 19.8 19.8 21.2 23.6 25.0 26.3 28.2
By miscellaneous criteria 
Small low-income countries 32.3 32.5 33.2 40.6 44.8 46.2 50.4 57.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 24.3 24.5 23.5 29.2 35.4 40.4 41.9 43.4
By alternative analytical categories 
Nonoil developing
countries 24.7 23.0 23.9 27.4 33.4 35.7 36.7 37.6
Net oil exporters 40.2 39.3 36.2 39.3 52.7 65.2 60.0 58.2
Net oil importers 22.5 20.8 22.0 25.0 29.9 31.1 32.6
33.9
SOURCE: IMF', World Economic Outlook.
a. Does nol include debt owed to the Fund.
b. Ratio of year-end debt to exports of goods and services or GDP for year indicated, 
o. Includes South Africa.
TABLE 3
------------------ SOME ECONOMIC INDICATORS FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA*
(billion dollars and percentage change)
1976 1977 1978 1979
Imports
Value of goods and services 20.6 23.3 28.2 32.5
Unit value price index 57.9 63.4 71.3 83.9
Value of goods and services 
(including Nigeria) 31.7 37.8 43.3 48.6
Volume, annual change - 4 .6 5.7 8.5 -4 .9
Exports
Value of goods and services 16.9 19.8 20.9 25.2
Unit value price index 58.3 73.3 74.8 88.7
Value of goods and services 
(including Nigeria) 27.8 32.5 32.5 43.2
Volume, annual change 5.4 -6 .1 3.9 1.3
Real GDP growth 3.8 1.4 1.9 2.1
Change in consumer prices*1 20.0 28.0 22.2 26.7
Terms o f  trade 
Index 100.7 115.7 104.9 105.7
Annual change 9.6 14.9 - 9 .3 0.8
Nonod commodity prices 
Annual change 32.1 36.6 -  13.1 14.4
Reserves
Ratio to short-tenp debt 2.7 2.2 1.9 2.1
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook
a. Excludes Nigeria, unless otherwise indicated.
b. Weighted averages.
TABLE 4 EXTERNAL FINANCING, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
(billion dollars)
1976 1977 1978 1979
Current account deficit - 4 .5 - 6 .0 -1 1 .4 - 6 .4
Nondebt creating flows, net 2.1 2.6 3.0 4.3
Official transfers 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.6
Direct investment 0.7 0.6 0.7 1.0
SDR allocations, valuation
adjustments, and gold monetization — — 0.2 0.8
Use of reserves — 0.3 2.3 -3 .7
Asset transactions, net* - 0 .8 - 0 .8 - 0 .3 -0 .3
Recorded errors and omissions1 - 0 .4 -0 .2 0.4 -0 .4
Net external borrowing 3.4 t 4.2 5.9 6.5
Reserve-related liabilities 0.3 0.2 0.7 0.3
Liabilities constituting foreign
authorities reserves' — 0.1 0.3 0.1
Use of Fund credit 0.3 — 0.2 0.4
Arrears 0.1 0.1 0.2 - 0 .2
Long-term borrowing from official
creditors* 2.3 2.0 2.7 4.9
Other borrowing* 0.8 2.0 2.5 1.2
— Zero or negligible.
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
a. Pertains primarily to export credits.
b. Positioned here on the presumption that estimates reflect primarily unrecorded capital outflows, 
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1.2 5.0 - 2 .0
7.8 4.5 -8 .3
1.6 1.2 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.2 I
t o01
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
- 6 .9 -  18.4 -  18.7 -  13.6 - 7 .0 - 6 .9
3.6 2.9 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.5
3.2 3.0 3.1 3.3 3.4 3.6
-0 .1 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.8
0.6 -  1.0 __ __ __ __
- 4 .3 6.5 2.9 0.3 - 0 .6 0.6
- 0 .7 -0 .5 -0 .3 -0 .2 - 0 .2 - 0 .2
0.2 — -1 .9 - 2 .0 - 0 .2 - 0 .5
8.2 9.5 13.6 11.2 3.8 2.4
1.7 2.4 6.3 5.6 0.8 0.6
0.7 0.4 0.1 0.1 -0 .1 - 0 .7
0.4 1.5 0.8 13 0.6 —
0.6 0.6 5.4 4.2 0.2 1.2
5.0 5.7 4.0 6.3 5.0 2.5
1.5 1.4 3.4 - 0 .7 - 2 .0 -0 .7
m
- 3 1 -
TABLE 5
CONCESSIONALITY STRUCTURE OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN DEBT 
(percentage)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Multilateral
Conces­
sional 58.26 57.52 55.41 58.15 59.34 60.51 60.30 59.41 56.54 57.61 58.54
Nonconces­
sional 41.74 42.48 44.59 41.85 40.66 39.49 39.70 40.59 43.46 42.39 41.46
Bilateral
Conces­
sional 84.31 81.46 82.05 80.15 70.75 67.13 66.39 64.78 58.11 58.51 61.92
Nonconces­
sional 15.69 18.54 17.95 19.85 29.25 32.87 33.61 35.22 41.89 41.49 38.08
N o t e : TTiis table is based on new disbursements data for 24 sub-Saharan African countries, which 
accounted for 95 percent of total sub-Saharan African debt at the end of (985.
So u r c e : World Bank.
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T A B L K  6 EXTERNAL DEBT OUTSTANDING
(b illion dollars, unless otherwise noted)
I Afrtcñ 
Totol debt
Medium- and long-term 
Publicly guaranteed 











































1978 1979 I960 1981 ¡982 1983 1984
I98S
33.5 41.9 53.7 62.4 77.7 85.6
88 9 n.a.
30.3 38.2 45.1 51.3 56.7 68.4 70.3
72.8
28.5 35.8 42.2 48.2 54.9 66.6 68.5
70 9
20.4 20.0 21.3 21.5 21.8 20.2 22.0 24.3
40.6 42.9 42.8 43.2 40.2 38.6 40.5 41.2
26.6 28.2 27.6 28.4 32.7 30.8 27.2 24.4
12.4 8.9 8.3 6.9 5.3 10.4 10.3 10.1
1.8 2.4 2.9 3.1 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0
1.9 2.0 2.5 2.9 7.2 2.9 3.5 3.5
1.3 1.7 2.0 3.4 4.0 5.1 5.3 6.0
n.a. n.a. 4.2 4.8 9.8 9.2 9.9 n.a.
(n .a.) (n .a.) ' (19) (22) (23) (21) (22) n.a.
Market korromr rt
Total debt
Medium- and long-term 
Publicly guaranteed 







Outatand ing uae ai Fund credit 
Arrear»
(number o f countries)
3.4 3.9 5.4 8.5 11.4 14.0
3 .4 3.9 5.2 8.2 11.0 13.5
3.2 3.6 4.8 7.4 9.7 11.5
18.3 18.3 16.7 13.4 11.6 11.7
31 0 30.1 27.9 28.0 28.1 28.0
20.9 29 4 38.2 47.2 51.4 53 4
29.7 22.2 17.2 11.4 8.8 7.0
0.2 0 .3 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.9
_ — 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
_ — — — — —
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. —
(n .a .) (n .a .) (n .a .) (n .a.) (n .a.) (1 )
17.1 26.8 33.5 33.9 n.a.
16.3 17.6 26.3 25.5 25.1
13.9 16.5 25.2 24 X 24.0
10.5 11.4 9.0 10.3 13.5
27.2 12.6 17.8 20.8 21 9
56.8 71.8 54.7 49.5 44.8
5.5 4.3 18.5 19.3 19.8
2.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2
0.4 4.5 0.5 0.9 0.9
0 .4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6
0.1 4.2 6.0 7.0 n.a.
(2) (3) (3) (3) n.a.
OfftcuU t 
Total debt
Medium- and long-term 
Publicly guaranteed 







Outstanding uae o í Fund credit 
Arreara
(number o í countries)
102 13.8 16.4 19.1 22.8 30.5 34.9 39.4 39.4 41.1 n.a.
9.6 12.0 14.2 16.5 20.0 23.0 25.7 28.8 30.7 32.4 34.3
9 0 11.3 13.3 16.1 19.6 22.7 25.5 28.6 30.6 32.1 34.0
15.7 16.1 18.2 20.4 21.2 23.7 24.6 24.8 25.8 27.2 28 3
53.1 54.5 49 4 47.0 52.4 53.0 54.6 57.6 57.2 57.4 57.3
17.9 17.5 19.4 20.5 19.0 15.8 14.1 12.3 12.0 11.1 10.4
13.3 11.9 13.0 12.1 7.4 7.5 6.6 5.3 5.0 4.2 4.0
0 .6 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
0.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.1
2.1
0.5 0 .8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.6 2.5 2.8 3.5 3.8
4.4
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 4.2 4.7 5.6 3.1 2.8
n.a




Medium- and long-term 
Publicly guaranteed 







Out standif^; uae o í Fund credit 
Arrears
(number o í com nines)__________
—  Zero or negligible, 
n.a. Not available.
S o u rc e : IM F, Woeid Economic Outlook.
a. Loans and credit* from the World Bank, regional development banks and other 
and inte rgovernmental agencies.
b Loans from governments and their agencies (including central banks) and loans from 
public bodies. ■ Li* i
c. Loans from private banks and other private financial institutions and publicly 
privately placed bonda. .. . _____ . .
d. Supplier»’ credit*, external liabilities on account o í natwnalited properties and 
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TABLE 7 AVERAGE TERMS OF NEW PUBLIC DEBT COMMITMENTS*
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 ¡981 1982 1983 1984
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Interest (percentage) 5.6 5.4 5.5 6.6 7.6 7.3 9.3 7.9 8.1 5.8
Maturity (years) 19.9 18.8 18.2 16.5 15.4 17.5 15.3 18.5 15.9 23.6
Grace period (years) 5.3 5.2 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.9 4.4 5.0 4.1 5.6
Grant element (percentage) 30.0 30.3 29.0 23.2 16.9 21.2 9.2 18.0 16.7 33.3
Low-income Africa 
Interest (percentage) 4.6 4.2 4.0 4.6 5.3 4.7 5.0 4.4 3.4 3.8
Maturity (years) 23.6 23.1 23.4 22.4 20.4 22.4 23.8 28 2 28.6 30.2
Grace period (years) 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.6 5.4 5.8 5.9 6.8 6.7 6.9
Grant element (percentage) 38.7 41.2 42.0 38.4 33.2 38.7 38.0 44.4 50.6 49.4
Low-income Asia 
Interest (percentage) 2.5 3.6 2.8 2.1 2.8 4.0 5.1 5.8 5.1 5.4
Maturity (years) 31.5 27.9 34.1 38.2 32.5 30.3 30.6 28.8 27.5 29.5
Grace period (years) 8.1 7.2 8.2 9.1 7.9 7.3 7.2 7.1 6.4 7.2
Grant element (percentage) 59.2 49.5 59.2 66.7 58.2 49.6 45.4 37.4 40.3 39.3
SOURCE: World Bank. World Debt Tables; and Fund staff estimates.
a. Average terms of borrowing for new loans contracted during the year.
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T A B L E  8  SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: RANKING ACCORDING TO DEBT OUTSTANDING, 
END-1985
Debt outstanding
Distribution o f  medium - 
and long-term publicly 
guaranteed debt 
(percentage share)
Use o f M ulti­ B ilat­ Financial Scheduled
Total* Fund credit lateral eral institu­ interest Debt- Debt-
(billion (m illion credi­ credi­ tions and payments export CD P
Country dollars) dollars) tors tors other ratiob ratio ' ratio6
Nigeria 16.6 (0.0) 8.3 17.9 73.8 13.0 134.6 21.5
Sudan 8.3 (664.9) 15.5 67.6 16.9 68.8 1,232.4 100.1
Ivory Coast 8.0 (621.7) 26.0 28.2 45.9 16.6 238.1 116.9
Zaire 5.3 (721.0) 15.1 65.2 19.7 17.3 258.3 203.5
Zambia 4.2 (761.6) 21.0 58.0 21.0 39.7 464.0 455.3
Kenya 3.5 (485.7) 54.2 27.1 18.7 8.7 224.8 57.3
Tanzania 3.4 (21.1) 39.7 56.0 4.2 23.3 743.3 62.5
Mozambique 2.6 (0.0) 8.9 55.7 35.4 68.6 1,518.6 129.2
Zimbabwe 2.4 (264.1) 11.1 17.6 71.3 12.5 164.3 20.0
Madagascar 2.3 (161.4) 22.1 59.7 18.1 21.9 634.1 101.8
Senegal 2.3 (241.1) 28.4 54.8 16.8 18.5 285.1 93.4
Ghana 2.2 (656.0) 36.0 43.9 20.1 21.6 324.9 21.2
Ethiopia 1.9 (49.5) 46.8 41.4 11.8 9.0 339.4 36.5
Cameroon 1.8 (0.0) 34.8 41.8 23.4 4.2 74.0 21.7
Somalia 1.5 (142.2) 30.2 65.5 4.4 7.5 909.1 205.1
Mauritania 1.4 (30.3) 26.8 62.6 10.7 15.8 378.5 215.0
Guinea 1.3 02 .6 ) 20.4 Ó6.0 13.7 3.2 254.7 74.4
Congo 1.3 (0.0) 22.4 36.7 40.9 7.2 105.2 60.9
Mali 1.2 (80.7) 34.2 63.3 2.6 10.4 563.8 138.4
Uganda 1.2 (282.4) 51.0 38.8 10.2 12.4 279.2 33.1
Liberia 1.0 (225.6) 34.3 46.2 19.5 9.9 215.6 103.8
Niger 1.0 (66.7) 36.3 37.8 26.0 21.2 322.3 64.0
Malawi 0.9 (133.9) 63.3 23.2 13.5 18.6 343.0 78.7
Benin 0.8 (0.0) 35.6 12.6 51.8 16.4 326.0 78.9
Togo 0.8 (62.5) 39.5 54.0 6.5 6.8 315.7 114.7
Gabon 0.7 (0.0) 6.6 31.9 61.5 3.3 34.3 21.5
Burkina Faso 0.6 (0.0) 68.3 27.4 4.3 9.2 366.6 73.4
Mauritius 0.6 (159.3) 45.0 29.4 25.6 10.7 103.5 63.1
Sierra Leone 0.4 (78.4) 38.2 41.1 20.7 23.2 314.9 57.2
Burundi 0.4 (0.0) 62.8 29.3 7.8 9.8 312.3 40.2
Botswana 0.3 (0.0) 56.2 28.7 15.1 3.3 38.8 40.8
Rwanda 0.3 (0.0) 78.0 22.0 — 4.8 175.5 19.6
Central African
Republic 0.3 (28.4) 49.8 41.4 8.8 6.7 169.1 58.0
Guinea-Bissau 0.3 (3.1) 46.9 41.3 11.7 38.6 1,042.0 129.4
Swaziland 0.2 (9.9) 51.0 33.8 15.2 4.9 75.6 57.8
Gambia 0.2 (27.2) 52.5 30.9 16.6 9.8 271.3 109.6
Chad 0.2 (8.7) 65.4 25.4 9.1 3.3 197.7 256.0
Lesotho 0.1 (0.0) 90.8 7.1 2.1 1.7 45.3 59.1
Comoros 0.1 (0.0) 47.1 52.9 0.1 9.1 625.9 123.1
Equatorial Guinea 0.1 (7.9) 19.6 55.9 24.5 16.7 473.9 125.7
Djibouti 0.1 (0.0) 18.8 24.0 57.3 1.1 53.0 23.8
Sao Tomé and
Principe 0.1 (0.0) 48.4 45.1 6.6 12.7 579.0 295.1
Cape Verde 0.1 (0.0) 50.6 49.4 — 7.7 212.8 96.7
Seychelles 0.1 (0.0) 16.0 76.5 7.4 — 90.0 51.7
—  Zero or negligible.
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook; IMF, International Financial Statistics; and Fund slaff 
estímales.
a. Excludes arrears, includes medium-, long-, and short-term, publicly guaranteed and unguar­
anteed debt, plus outstanding use of Fund credit.
b. Scheduled interest payments and charges for use of Fund credit over exports of goods and 
services.
c. Total deht outstanding plus outstanding use of Fund credit over exports of goods and services.
d. Total debt outstanding plus outstanding use of Fund credit over nominal GDP.
TABLE 9  EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICE
(billion dollars, unless otherwise noted)
197S 1976 1977 1978 1979
Sub-Saharan Africa 
Interest* 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.4 1.9
Amortizationb 1.3 1.6 1.5 2.2 2.5
Total 2.1 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.4
As percentage of exports of goods 
and services 8.8 8.7 8.1 10.9 10.2
Interest payments ratio' 3.2 3.1 3.5 4.2 4.5
Debt-export ratio1 66.7 74.0 80.3 102.3 96.1
Implicit average interest rate' 5.8 4.1 4.4 4.1 4.6
Market borrowers 
Interest 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.8
Amortization 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.0
Total 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.3 1.9
As percentage of exports of goods 
and services 3.6 4.2 3.8 8.1 7.8
Interest payments ratio 1.0 1.1 1.2 2.8 3.5
Debt-export ratio 28.2 26.7 31.2 51.2 47.4
Implicit average interest rate 3.5 4.0 3.9 5.5 7.5
Official borrowers 
Interest 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.7
Amortization 0.9 1.0 0.8 1.0 1.1
Total 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.8
As percentage of exports of goods 
and services 19.5 18.3 17.1 17.7 15.7
Interest payments ratio 7.7 7.1 8.4 7.0 6.4
Debt-export ratio 134.9 160.4 169.1 194.4 191.6
Implicit average interest rate 5.7 4.4 4.9 3.6 3.3
Diversified borrowers 
Interest 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Amortization 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
Total 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7
As percentage of exports of goods 
and services 5.2 5.0 6.0 7.8 9.4
Interest payments ratio 1.8 1.9 2.3 3.4 4.4
Debt-export ratio 57.1 64.2 79.6 94.3 101.1
Implicit average interest rate 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.6 4.3
n.a. Not available.
SOURCE: IMF, World Economic Outlook.
a. Includes charges on use of Fund credit.
b. Includes IMF repurchases.
c. Interest payments over exports of goods and services.
d. Total debt outstanding over exports of goods and services.
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TABLE 10 OFFICIAL M ULTILATERAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK DEBT
RESTRUCTURING, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 1980-85 
AMOUNT RESTRUCTURED 
(million dollars)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Central African Republic
Paris Club — 72 — 13 — 8
Commercial banks — — — — — —
Equatorial Guinea
Paris Club — — — — — 36
Commercial banks — — — — — —
Ivory Coast
Paris Club — — — — 356 234
Commercial banks — — — — — 501
Liberia
Paris Club 35 30 — 17 17 —
Commercial banks — — 30 — — 35
Madagascar
Paris Club — 140 107 — 89 135
Commercial banks — 147 — — 195 —
Malawi
Paris Club — — 25 26 — —
Commercial banks — — — 57 — —
Mauritania
Paris Club — — — — — 78
Commercial banks — — — — — —
Mozambique
Paris Club — — — — 404 —
Commercial banks — — — — 213 192
Niger
Paris Club — — — 36 26 40
Commercial banks — — — — 26 —
Nigeria
Paris Club — — — — — —
Commercial banks — — — 1,935 — —
Senegal
Paris Club — 75 74 72 — 117
Commercial banks — — — — 78 20
Sierra Leone
Paris Club 37 — — — 25 —
Commercial banks — — — — 25 —
Somalia
Paris Club — — — — — 122
Commercial banks 
Sudan
— — — — —
Paris Club — — 80 536 269 —
Commercial banks — 498 55 790 838 —
Togo
Paris Club — 232 — 300 75 35
Commercial banks 69 — — 84 — —
Uganda
Paris Club — 30 19 — — —
Commercial banks — — — — — —
Zaire
Paris Club — 500 — 1,497 — 400
Commercial banks 402 — — 58 64 —
Zambia
Paris Club — — — 375 253 —
Commercial banks — — — — 73 61
—  Zero or negligible. 
So u r c e : Fund staff estimates.
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TABLE 1 1  COMPONENTS OF PER CAPITA INCOME GROWTH, SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA AND SOUTH ASIA, 1960-81 
(annual percentage change)
1960-70 1970-81 Difference between
Region and indicator (1 ) (2 ) (2 ) and 111
(A ) Sub-Saharan Africa
Real GDP growth 3.8 3.2 - 0 .6
Population growth 2.4 2.8 0.4
Per capita income growth 1.4 0.4 -  1.0
Investment as a percentage of GDP 15.6 21.8 6.2
(B ) South Asia
Real GDP growth 4.0 3.9 -0 .1
Population growth 2.4 2.2 -0 .2
Per capita income growth 1.6 1.7 0.1
Investment as a percentage o f GDP 16.7 19.4 2.7
Difference between (B) and (A )
Real GDP growth 0.2 0.7
Population growth 0.0 -0 .6
Per capita income growth 0.2 1.3
Investment as a percentage of GDP 1.1 -2 .4
SOURCE: World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Joint Program o f  
Action, Washington, 1984.
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T A B L E  1 2  PERFORMANCE, EXTERNAL SHOCKS, AND A V A ILA B IL ITY  OF INVESTMENT RESOURCES, SELECTED INDICATORS









o f debt 
rescheduling
Growth rate o f  GDP 
(percentage), five-year 
average ended in
Loss o f  in­
come due to 
deterioration 
















(percentage o f  G D P), 
five-year average 
ended in
Countries 1970-81 (years) 1971 1976 1981 (percentage) ments standing 1971 1976 1981 1971 1976 1981
Chad - 4 .6 1.4 1.9 -8 .1 1.0 0.7 0.1 13 12 13 8 15 28
Mali 1.8 3.3 5.4 2.2 3.7 2.0 0.7 17 15 16 10 18 18
Burkina Faso 1.6 3.1 4.5 2.9 1.1 1.8 2.6 11 23 18 12 21 25
Somalia 1.0 2.7 3.8 4.6 -3 .1 * 1.7 1.2 12 18 18» 7 14 13»
Niger -0 .1 1983 1.3 - 1 .7 7.5 - 2 .8 5.9 7.4 15 25 32 8 15 10
Gambia, The 1.7 3.5 7.4 0.2 6.0 3.1 3.1 8 9 26 4 1 29
Ethiopia 0.6 4.0 2.6 3.0 0.2 3.8 2.7 13 11 9 2 1 5
Guinea-Bissau n.a. n.a. 5.0 1.8 n.a. 6.4 1.0 n.a. 23 26 n.a. 43 36
Zaire -3 .1 1976-81, 83 3.7 0.2 0.1 2.3' 2.2 1.0 26 32 29 - 2 13 13d
Malawi 2.6 1982-83 5.6 5.4 4.1 3.0 3.5 4.6 19 27 30 12 12 13
Uganda -4 .3 1981-82 4.8 - 0 .4 -2 .5 n.a. 2.9 2.2 14 9 4d - 1 -  1 1
Rwanda 1.8 7.4 5.6 5.3 1.1 1.2 1.1 8 12 22 6 8 11
Burundi 1.4 7.3 1.9 5.1 0.6 5.4 1.6 8 7 14 3 5 9
Tanzania 0.8 4.7 5.4 2.5 0.1* 4.0 2.5 20 21 22 3 8 11
Benin 0.6 2.6 2.3 4.1 3.4 7.2 5.0 16 16 23 10 15 24
Central African
Republic - 0 .6 1981,83 3.5 2.7 - 0 .3 10.8 3.5 1.1 20 17 10 16 13 14
Guinea 0.9 3.1 5.5 1.0 n.a. 3.4 1.9 n.a. n.a. 14 n.a. n.a. - 3
Madagascar - 2 .2 1981-84 5.1 -0 .7 0.2 6.2 5.0 3.0 17 14 19 7 3 11
Togo 0.7 1979-81, 83 6.0 3.3 3.4 - 5 .8 4.7 2.6 15 22 39 1 5 22
Ghana -3 .2 4.9 -1 .7 1.2 - 1 .4 3.2 2.5 13 10 6 2 - 2 1
Kenya 2.1 7.4 6.0 6.2 4.2 6.0 6.9 22 23 28 1 3 7
Sierra Leone - 0 .8 1977, 80. 84 4.4 1.2 2.4 3.2 0.7 2.5 15 14 13 3 9 10
Sudan 3.1 1979, 81-83 2.6 6.2 4.1 1.5 3.6 0.2 13 16 16 4 5 10
Mauritania -0 .6 4.3 3.0 1.9 4.0 2.6 2.9 25 32 36 - 9 15 35
Liberia -1 .8 1980-83 6.1 1.7 0.6 5.6 4.4 2.3 25 30 32 - 2 9 - 1 4 4
Senegal 0.1 1981-84 1.4 4.0 1.2 1.1 4.3 6.7 14 19 19 6 7 15
Lesotho 5.7 1.0 11.9 7.3 -1 .5 13.0 3.2 9 13 22 33 52 63
Zambia - 2 .7 1983 2.9 3.4 -1 .8 25.5 6.8 3.9 32 36 23 -1 2 - 3 3
Zimbabwe - 0 .3 7.2 4.4 4.8 n.a. 8.9 10.1 22 26 18 1 - 1 1
Botswana 8.3 12.1 17.7 9.7 4.2 9.7 7.9 36 55 42 38 26 20
Swaziland 1.2 8.6 4.1 5.4 8.5' 3.2 5.4 21 26 37 - 3 -  15 23
Ivory Coast 1.1 1983-84 7.1 6.8 4.7 — 5.1 13.5 10.3 19 2*1 27 - 3 - 2 2
Mauritius 4.4 1.3 8.4 3.1 -9 .9 8.6 9.6 13 25 28 2 - 1 11
Nigeria 1.9 1983 10.6 6.6 0.4 -1 4 .7 13.9 14.6 17 24 27 1 - 6 - 2
Cameroon 4.0 4.2 4.5 9.1 2.1 9.2 5.6 15 20 25 1 2 3
Congo, People's
Republic of the 2.5 6.7 6.6 8.6 1.0 10.4 8.1 28 35 32 25 20 7
Gabon 2.9 1978 6.7 21.4 -1 0 .5 8.8 9.3 38 53 41 - 2 - 9 -2 1
Sub-Saharan Africa*
(37 countries) n.a. 6.5 5.3 1.6 -5 .9 n.a. n.a. 18 23 21 1 - 7 33
Countries with below 
average growth in
per capita income' - 1 .0 3.8 2.3 1.6 5.0 n.a. n.a. 21 23 23 - 0 7 56 109
n.a. Not available.
SOURCE: World Bank, Toward Sustained Development in sub-Saharan Africa.
a. Average for 1971-79
b. Five-year average ending in 1979
c. Average for 1971-80
d. Five-year average ending in 1980
e. Excludes Angola and Mozambique, averages in this row relate to the countries for which data are presented in the table.
f. Consists o f Niger, Ethiopia, Zaire, Tanzania, Benin, Central African Repubic, Madagascar, Togo, Sierra Leone, Mauritania. Liberia, Senegal, and Zam! id 
Includes all countries with below average annual per capita income growth during 1970-81, excluding Chad, Uganda. Ghana, and Zimbabwe, which w : 
severely unsettled politically during this period.
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TABLE 13 INVESTMENT, SAVINGS. AND RESOURCE BALANCE. SUB-SAHARAN 
AFRICA
(percentage of GDP at current prices)
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
Gross domestic investment 22.5 24.8 21.2 18.5 14.5
Gross domestic savings 21.9 17.2 13.3 13.0 13.9
Resource balance - 0 .8 - 7 .9 - 8 .0 - 5 .7 - 0 .6
Memorandum item 
Gross domestic investment 
(percentage of GDP) 
in South Asia 23.4 23.0 23.2 22.9 22.9
So u r c e : W orld Bank data.




Long- and medium-term" 68.8 10.3 79.1
Short-termb 4.8 21.6 26.4
Arrears' 9.4 5.6 15.0
IMF 5.1 — 5.1
Total 88.1 37.5 125.6
SOURCE: Reginal Herbold Green and S. Griffith Jones, “Sub-Saharan Africa’s External Debt 
Crisis,”  in Third World Affairs— 1986 (London: Third World Foundation, 1986), p. 26.
a. Revision of 15 percent estimated on recorded government guaranteed debt, due to general 
omissions, failure to update for currency fluctuations, and private external debt.
b. Estimated at 25 percent of long-term debt (excluding normal 90 day or less commercial bills). 
That estimate corresponds roughly to data for a handful of countries for which detailed studies 
have been done, e.g., by the World Bank.
c. Reestimated on fragmentary data. Includes arrears o f interest as well as principal, of commercial 
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A. IMF NET FLOWS BY COUNTRY, 1980-85 
($ million, 1983 prices and exchange rates)
TABLE 18
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Low-Income
of which:
460 1,113 658 1,089 450 191
Ghana -12 -11 4 278 215 122
Zaire 16 104 120 128 107 66
Zambia 7 358 -49 80 78 -19
Madagascar 46 36 57 12 18 -4
Malawi 29 27 2 26 18 7
Senegal 45 59 44 28 17 15
Liberia 20 52 71 55 16 -7
Niger - - - 33 15 16
Sudan 132 168 46 162 14 -5
Togo 20 8 - 23 13 7
Sierra Leone 0 28 - 23 11 -4
Somalia 7 30 35 51 -3 26
Mauritania 16 4 17 -2 “9 -3
Kenya 65 26 147 96 -12 54
Uganda 34 129 92 108 -17 -65
Ethiopia - 76 23 -19 -21 -31
Tanzania 18 -12 -10 -20 -25 -5
Middle Income
of which:
75 468 492 472 99 -72
Zimbabwe 40 43 - 164 83 -21
Ivory Coast (Cote d'Ivoire) 15 377 127 179 14 -38
Cameroon -16 -10 -3 13 7 -




B. SUB-■SAHARAN AFRICA: NET USE 
(SDR million)
OF IMF CREDIT .
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Total purchases* 1,285 1,805 1,046 740 573
Repurchases 241 352 505 623 851
Total purchases less 1,045 1,453 541 117 -278
repurchases 
Net use of fund credit** 678 1,237 505 105 -227
Trust Fund repayments 1 13 60 103 153
Net flow of Finance 677 1,224 445 2 -380
* includes reserve tranche purchases 
** excludes reserve tranche
Source: IMF
- 4 4 -
TABLE 19
FINANCIAL FLOWS TO IDA ELIGIBLE SSA1 
(Annual Averages in $ billions)
Projected
1980-82 1983-84 1986-90
Grants 4.1 4.2 5.22
Concessional Loans 2.4 2.2 3-3
Other Loans 2.6 1.5 1.0
Total Inflow 9.1 7.9 9.5
liInterest 1.7 2.0 3.03
Amortisation 2.3 2.9 3.8
Total Outflow 4.0 4.9 6.8
Net Inflow Before
Rescheduling and Other-5 5.1 3.0 2.7
Rescheduling and Other 1.1 1.8 2.3
Net Financial 0.7 0.6 1.0
Resource Inflow 6.9 5.4 6.0
Notes:
1. Excludes Mozambique.
2. Assumes 1$ a year real growth.
3. On existing and projected future borrowing.
4. Includes payments to IMF.
5. Largely net short term capital and IMF 
purchases, also includes direct investment 
plus errors and omissions.
Source: Adapted from World Bank, Financing Adjustment with 
Growth: Sub-Saharan Africa 1986-90» 1986.
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